Abstract

In Nyāya philosophy, a special kind of extraordinary sensory connection is admitted named jñānalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti or jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa. It is held that sometimes our sense-organ can be connected to such an object which is not amenable to the operating sense-organ. In such cases, cognition (jñāna) plays the role of sensory connection and connects the content of itself to the operating sense-organ. The paradigmatic example of jñānalakṣaṇa perception is to ‘see’ fragrant sandal through visual sense from non-smellable distance. This hypothesis of jñānalakṣaṇa has been criticized by the opponents being considered as counterintuitive, mysterious and theoretically overloaded. This paper tries to demystify the notion. It shows that although it seems to be metaphysically mysterious phenomenon at first sight, it is not so at all. The paper explores the psychological process involved in this sensory connection. The hypothesis is shown to have sufficient explanatory power, because the Naiyāyikas have used this hypothesis to explain five different epistemic situations. Hence, this paper argues that it is not a theoretical overload. The opponents counter-argue that all those five cognitive situations can be explained without admitting jñānalakṣaṇa. Moreover, if we admit jñānalakṣaṇa, then a particular kind of inference will become redundant. The paper answers all those objections and defends the hypothesis. The second part of the paper presents an empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis. The arguments leveled against the hypothesis of jñānalakṣaṇa can be contested on the ground that they try to disprove something which is supported on experimental ground. Experiments represent universally acceptable objective facts supported by experience—denying which amounts to anubhavavirodha, which philosophers would want to avoid. Hence, supporting jñānalakṣaṇa on the ground of scientific experiments can be considered as a philosophical stand. Now, there is a clinically recognized and neurophysiologically proved condition, called synaesthesia, where stimulation of a particular sensory modality automatically and involuntarily activates a different sensory modality simultaneously without a direct stimulation of the second modality. As for example, when a sound → colour synaesthete listens to a particular tone such as C-sharp, she visualizes particular colour, such as blue, in her mind’s eye; for a grapheme → colour synaesthete a particular number or alphabet is always tinged with a particular colour. This paper shows that the cognitive process involved in synaesthesia lends support to the hypothesis of jñānalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti. It has been proved through several experiments that it is a genuine perceptual phenomenon and is not a confabulation of memory. There are several alternative theories which explain the phenomenon neurophysiologically. The paper discusses the most popular one: the cross-activation hypothesis. There are two major objections against the project of comparing jñānalakṣaṇa with synaesthesia. First, synaesthesia is a neurological condition present in a few numbers of people whereas jñānalakṣaṇa is claimed to be universal phenomenon. Second, syneasthesia is a sensory experience whereas jñānalakṣaṇa involves application of concepts. The paper answers these questions. Firstly, multimodal processing in the brain is a universal phenomenon; secondly, there is a form of synaesthesia where top-down processing is involved. In those cases, concepts play important role for having synaesthetic experience.