Abstract

Possible world semantics considers not only what an expression actually refers to but also what it might have referred to in counterfactual circumstances. This has proven exceptionally useful both inside and outside philosophy. The way this is achieved is by using intensions. An intension of an expression is a function that assigns to each possible world the reference of the expression in that world. However, the specific intension of terms has been subject to frequent disputes. How is one to determine the intension of a term? Carnap has shown how the intension of a term depends on the type of that term. Two-dimensional semantics has shown how intensions also depend on the actual state of affairs. I will show how, in addition, intensions are no less dependent on metaphysical criteria of identity. Furthermore, I will reveal how these three factors interact to fix the exact intension of a term. In other words, I propose an outline of the overall mechanism by which intensions are being fixed.