Critical Reflection and Common-Sense Beliefs

European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 9 (2) (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I explore the connection between pragmatism and common sense by reflecting upon two seemingly contrasting Peircean remarks about the pragmatic method: (a) its “basis on the doctrine of common sense” and (b) the recommendation that a proposition p be explicated in light of critical, deliberate, or “self-controlled” conduct ensuing from a belief that p. I show that Peirce’s focus on phenomena of self-control is situated within his broader interest in the nature of reasoning. The “secret of rational consciousness,” according to Peirce, does not consist in the reflective or self-conscious nature of our most deliberate forms of conduct, per se, “as in the review of the process of self-control in its entirety.” The rationality of an inference consists in its capacity to restore the stability our “acritical” beliefs enjoyed before being unsettled by doubts. On this view, Peirce’s pragmatic theory of rational inquiry as aiming at the fixation of belief depends on a conception of belief as constituted by a tendency toward stability. In the rest of the paper, I argue that this conception avoids the shortcoming of purely “motivational” accounts of belief without denying this status of belief to our acritical intellectual dispositions – a denial which is often implied by standard “truth-directed” accounts.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,774

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Beliefs’ self-knowledge: an objection to the method of transparency.Javier Vidal - 2019 - Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 14:429-448.
Peirce on the Epistemology of Religious Belief.Stanley Ralph Hall - 1994 - Dissertation, Saint Louis University
The courage of conviction.Sarah K. Paul - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):1-23.
Peirce on Inquiry and Truth.Thomas Edward Keith - 2001 - Dissertation, The Claremont Graduate University
Rationality and the Role of the Will in Belief Acquisition.Laurie Anne Catherine Pieper - 1993 - Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-01-24

Downloads
18 (#201,463)

6 months
6 (#1,472,471)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Francesco Poggiani
Pennsylvania State University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by J. David Velleman.
Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):263-275.

View all 10 references / Add more references