Oxford University Press (2001)
In this adventurous contribution to the project of combining philosophy and biology to understand the mind, Carolyn Price investigates what it means to say that mental states--like thoughts, wishes, and perceptual experiences--are about things in the natural world. Her insight into this deep philosophical problem offers a novel teleological account of intentional content, grounded in and shaped by a carefully constructed theory of functions. Along the way she defends her view from recent objections to teleological theories and indicates how it might be applied to notable problems in the philosophy of mind
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|Call number||B105.I56.P75 2001|
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Citations of this work BETA
How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind.Stephen A. Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (5):606-637.
Consumers Need Information: Supplementing Teleosemantics with an Input Condition.Nicholas Shea - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):404-435.
An Input Condition for Teleosemantics? Reply to Shea (and Godfrey-Smith).Ruth G. Millikan - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):436-455.
Content, Control and Display: The Natural Origins of Content.Kim Sterelny - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):549-564.
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