Abstract

The purpose of this dissertation is to understand and evaluate the political philosophy of John Stuart Mill, using his own descriptions of human activity as evidence and his own normative standards to measure the failures of the government he proposes. The dissertation begins with an exposition of Mill's model of practical rationality, which is crucial to understanding Mill's politics because he constantly relies on this model to design the form of government he recommends, even though this same model is inconsistent with Mill's methodological individualism. This individualism in Mill's moral science methodology is then examined carefully, guided by Mill's use of a distinction between chemical and mechanical causation, and exploring the political implications of Mill's views in the case of his argument for women's rights. I argue for an intepretation of Mill's philosophy in which historical considerations are prominent in the relations between the sciences and arts of morals and politics, in the concept of happiness in Mill's proof of the utility principle, and in the concept of improvement, which is the standard by which history itself is judged. I conclude that Mill's revision of utilitarianism is philosophically admirable in certain respects, though it abandons the claim of an eternal and sufficient arbiter of ethical conflict. ;Applying this perspective to his politics, I claim that Mill sought to form government in such a way as to foster improvement, by balancing the many with the wise and by restricting government in order to protect minorities from oppression by the preponderant commercial class. I argue that Mill's proposed government would not achieve the intended aims, and that this failure is largely attributable to Mill's not fully realizing the implications of his own revision of utilitarianism, and to his individualism, which prevents him from understanding and utilizing concerted political action to good advantage