Krzysztof Czerniawski. Trzy wersje epistemicznej teorii prawdy

Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 23 (1):133-139 (1970)
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Abstract

Few years ago Krzysztof Czerniawski has published a book „Three Versions of Epistemic Theory of Truth: Dummett, Putnam, Wright”. It drew my attention, for there are many works which are concerned with the philosophical problem of truth, but only few comparative studies between different ideas concerning theory of truth. Author focuses on so-called Epistemic Theory of Truth, which assumes—according to the characteristics of Wolfgang Künne—that being true depends to some extent on our judgement. It is clear that there were far more philosophers, who understood truth in similar way, e. g. Pierce, Brentano, Neurath, however, Czerniawski concentrates on the most recent history of Epistemic Theory of Truth. He also takes no account of philosophy of Habermas and Gadamer, whose ideas on truth can also be classified as „epistemic”, for they are built out of analytical tradition of philosophising. Thus, he chooses Michael Dummett, Hilary Putnam and Crispin Wright—three analytical philosophers who significantly contributed to the development of „epistemic” approaches to the problem of truth.

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Jakub Pruś
Jesuit University Ignatianum In Cracow

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