Truth and Convention

Dialectica 40 (1--2):69--77 (1987)
Abstract
SummaryI discuss a simple case in which theories with different ontologies appear equally adequate in every way. . I contend that the appearance of equal adequacy is correct, and that what this shows is that the notion of “existence” has a variety of different but legitimate uses. I also argue that this provides a counterexample to the claim advanced by Davidson, that conceptual relativity is incoherent.RésuméJe discute un cas simple où des théories comportant des ontologies différentes apparaissent également adéquates à tout point de vue. . Je prétends que ľapparence ?on;égale adéquation est correcte et ceci montre que la notion ?on;existence a plusieurs sens différents, mais également légitimes. Je montre aussi que cela constitue un contre‐exemple à la thèse avancée par Davidson, selon laquelle la relativité con‐ceptuelle est incoherénte.ZusammenfassungIch diskutiere einen einfachen Fall, wo Theorien mit verschiedenen Ontologien in jeder Beziehung als gleich adäquat erscheinen. . Ich behaupte, dass die Ansicht, wonach gleiche Adäquatheit bestehen soil, korrekt ist und dass entsprechend der Begriff der Existenz mehrere verschiedene Verwendungs‐weisen hat, die alle legitim sind. Ich argumentiere, dass damit ein Gegenbeispiel zu Davidsons Auffassung vorliegt, wonach die These der begrifflichen Relativität inkohärent sein soil
Keywords Putnam
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.1987.tb00880.x
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Ordinary Objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Bad Company and Neo-Fregean Philosophy.Matti Eklund - 2009 - Synthese 170 (3):393-414.
Neo-Fregean Ontology.Matti Eklund - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):95–121.
Neo-Fregeanism and Quantifier Variance.Theodore Sider - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):201–232.

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