Intuitionism

In Michael C. Rea (ed.), World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK (2002)
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Abstract

Begins the third part of the book, in which the author discusses two important alternatives to naturalism. The alternative that is discussed is intuitionism, a research programme that takes the methods of natural science and rational intuition, but nothing else, as basic sources of evidence. Argues that, unless one has intuitions that support the view that our world is the product of intelligent design, intuitionism is self‐defeating. Also argues that, though there might be empirical reason for thinking that intuition is reliable in some domains, this fact does not save intuitionism from self‐defeat, nor is it of any use to a naturalist in trying to avoid the ontological consequences described in earlier chapters of the book.

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Michael Rea
University of Notre Dame

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