Abstract

In the first quarter of the eighteenth century, four philosophers independently proposed immaterialist theories. Ontologies of this kind had been absent from the philosophical stage for several centuries, and their sudden and widespread revival suggests that there was something about the intellectual milieu at the turn of the seventeenth to the eighteenth century that made a move to immaterialism a natural step to take. This dissertation examines some of the factors which contributed to its revival. ;In this dissertation, immaterialist theories are placed against the backdrop of a philosophical division between early modern versions of Platonism and Epicureanism, the former accentuating the priority of the infinite over the finite and the latter stressing instead the priority of the finite over the infinite. The twin revivals of these two ancient philosophical systems were instrumental in giving rise to importantly different versions of immaterialism. Part One of the dissertation serves as an introduction to the two subsequent Parts, by laying out some relevant historical and philosophical details regarding Platonism, Epicureanism and immaterialism. In Part Two, it is shown how Berkeley's early theory can be viewed as an Epicurean form of immaterialism. It is suggested that, while coherent as far as it went, the early theory left some crucially important things out---above all, a sound conception of God---and that, for Berkeley to be in a position to incorporate such components into his philosophy, he was compelled to make certain adjustments to it. These adjustments led to his moving quite far, from the Epicureanism of his youth to the Platonism of his old age. ;Part Three culminates with a discussion of the philosophy of Jonathan Edwards. Edwards' own version of immaterialism, like Berkeley's later theory, had a strongly Platonist flavour. But, unlike Berkeley, Edwards drew on a sequence of seventeenth century theories concerning the relation between incorporeal extension and the divine substance. This enabled him to achieve a clearer conception of the divine ideas---the ones doing all the work in a Platonist immaterialist theory---than Berkeley ever managed