Learning of Pains; Wittgenstein's own Cartesian mistake at Investigations 246

Wittgenstein-Studien 3 (2012):261-285 (2012)
I consider the support variously offered for the remark at Philosophical Investigations 246: ‘It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain.’ Against the first sort of argument to be found in Wittgenstein and the literature I offer cases in which I learn of pain. Against the second sort of argument I develop the case in which I am persuaded by compelling evidence that I am, contrary to what I imagined, still in an emotional pain about N. I then consider the counter-argument that the mix of sensation and emotion in my second case makes it irrelevant as a criticism of Wittgenstein, but argue that the reverse holds. That ‘sensation’ is quite separate from ‘emotion’ is a Cartesian Mistake which is, I argue, implicit in Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘I know I am in pain’.
Keywords Wittgenstein  Philosophy of Mind  Emotion  Pain
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