Modal Rationalism and the Objection from the Insolvability of Modal Disagreement

Logos and Episteme 7 (2):171-183 (2016)
The objection from the insolvability of principle-based modal disagreements appears to support the claim that there are no objective modal facts, or at the very least modal facts cannot be accounted for by modal rationalist theories. An idea that resurfaced fairly recently in the literature is that the use of ordinary empirical statements presupposes some prior grasp of modal notions. If this is correct, then the idea that we may have a total agreement concerning empirical facts and disagree on modal facts, which is the starting point of the objection from the insolvability of modal disagreement, is undercut. This paper examines the no-separation thesis and shows that some of the arguments against the classical (empiricist) distinction between empirical and modal statements fail to be conclusive if they are taken to defend a strong notion of metaphysical possibility. The no-separation thesis appears to work only in theoretical frameworks where metaphysical modalities are considered (broadly) conceptual. For these reasons, the no-separation thesis cannot save modal rationalism from the insolvability of modal disagreement.
Keywords metaphysical modality  modal rationalism  principle-based account  modal disagreement  Alan Sidelle  Robert Brandom
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme20167217
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Modal Empiricism and Knowledge of De Re Possibilities: A Critique of Roca-Royes' Account.Duško Prelević - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (4):488–498.
Modal Epistemology.Stephen K. McLeod - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (3):235-245.
Modal Fictionalism and Possible-Worlds Discourse.David Liggins - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):151-60.
The Modal View of Essence.Sam Cowling - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):248-266.
Epistemic Modal Disagreement.Jonah Katz & Joe Salerno - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):141-153.
The Context of Essence.L. A. Paul - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):170-184.
The Moral Objection to Modal Realism.Bob Fischer - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (5):1015-1030.


Added to PP index

Total downloads
35 ( #174,564 of 2,267,118 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #29,657 of 2,267,118 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature