Synthese 147 (2):343-377 (2005)

Authors
Katrin Schulz
University of Amsterdam
Abstract
In this paper, a pragmatic approach to the phenomenon of free choice permission is proposed. Free choice permission is explained as due to taking the speaker (i) to obey certain Gricean maxims of conversation and (ii) to be competent on the deontic options, i.e. to know the valid obligations and permissions. The approach differs from other pragmatic approaches to free choice permission in giving a formally precise description of the class of inferences that can be derived based on these two assumptions. This formalization builds on work of Halpern and Moses (1984) on the concept of ‘only knowing’, generalized by Hoek et al., (1999, 2000), and Zimmermann’s (2000) approach to competence.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-005-1353-y
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References found in this work BETA

A Natural History of Negation.Laurence R. Horn - 1989 - University of Chicago Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Universal Density of Measurement.Danny Fox & Martin Hackl - 2006 - Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (5):537 - 586.
Expressing Permission.William B. Starr - 2016 - Semantics and Linguistic Theory 26:325-349.
Two Puzzles About Ability Can.Malte Willer - 2021 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (3):551-586.
Simplifying with Free Choice.Malte Willer - 2018 - Topoi 37 (3):379-392.

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