Causation, dispositions, and physical occasionalism

Zygon 52 (4):962-983 (2017)
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Abstract

Even though theistic philosophers and scientists agree that God created, sustains, and providentially governs the physical universe and even though much has been published in general regarding divine action, what is needed is a fine-grained, conceptually coherent account of divine action, causation, dispositions, and laws of nature consistent with divine aseity, satisfying the widely recognized adequacy conditions for any account of dispositions.1 Such an account would be a basic part of a more comprehensive theory of divine action in relation to the fundamental concepts of science and of mathematics. Our aim in this article is simply to present such a theory.

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Lisanne Winslow
University of NorthWestern St Paul

Citations of this work

What is God's Power?Graham Renz - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (3):87-112.

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References found in this work

Finkish dispositions.David Kellogg Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
Testability and meaning.Rudolf Carnap - 1936 - Philosophy of Science 3 (4):419-471.
Dispositions and conditionals.C. B. Martin - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):1-8.
Dispositions and antidotes.Alexander Bird - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):227-234.

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