The meta-inductivist's winning strategy in the prediction game: A new approach to Hume's problem

Philosophy of Science 75 (3):278-305 (2008)
Abstract
This article suggests a ‘best alternative' justification of induction (in the sense of Reichenbach) which is based on meta-induction . The meta-inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods which are accessible to her. It is demonstrated, and illustrated by computer simulations, that there exist meta-inductivistic prediction strategies whose success is approximately optimal among all accessible prediction methods in arbitrary possible worlds, and which dominate the success of every noninductive prediction strategy. The proposed justification of meta-induction is mathematically analytical. It implies, however, an a posteriori justification of object-induction based on the experiences in our world. *Received November 2005; revised March 2008. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Duesseldorf, Universitaetsstrasse 1, Geb. 23.21, Duesseldorf, Germany D-40225; e-mail: gerhard.schurz@phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de.
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DOI 10.1086/592550
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References found in this work BETA
The Logic of Reliable Inquiry.Kevin Kelly - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.
The Theory of Probability.Hans Reichenbach - 1949 - Berkeley: University of California Press.
Experience and Prediction.Hans Reichenbach - 1938 - University of Chicago Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Philosophy of Science Between the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities: Introduction.Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla, Alexander Gebharter & Gerhard Schurz - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (3):317-326.
How Much Evidence Should One Collect?Remco Heesen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2299-2313.

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