Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (1):31-35 (2016)
AbstractIn Animal Liberation I argued that we commonly ignore or discount the interests of sentient members of other species merely because they are not human, and that this bias in favour of members of our own species is, in important respects, parallel to the biases that lie behind racism and sexism. Shelly Kagan, in ‘What's Wrong With Speciesism’ misconstrues this argument, as well as the principle of equal consideration of interests, which I offer as an alternative to speciesism. Kagan also offers, as an alternative explanation of, and possible justification for, our discounting the interests of nonhuman animals, the suggestion that your interests count more if you are a member of a species whose typical adult members are persons. Although this view is not a form of speciesism, Kagan seems not to be aware of the fact that it is a view commonly defended by advocates of natural law ethics, on which there is already an extensive critical literature
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
No references found.
Citations of this work
You're Probably Not Really A Speciesist.Travis Timmerman - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):683-701.
Is Speciesism Wrong by Definition?François Jaquet - 2019 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 32 (3):447-458.
Ecological Justice and the Extinction Crisis: Giving Living Beings Their Due.Anna Wienhues - 2020 - Bristol, Vereinigtes Königreich: Bristol University Press.
Similar books and articles
What is Speciesism?Oscar Horta - 2010 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 23 (3):243-266.
Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others.Leslie Pickering Francis & Richard Norman - 1978 - Philosophy 53 (206):507 - 527.
Moving Mountains: Variations on a Theme by Shelly Kagan.Victor Tadros - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (2):393-405.
From Moral Rights to Constitutional Rights: Beyond Élitist and Electiv Speciesism.Sônia T. Felipe - 2007 - [email protected] - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 6 (2):205-216.
Modal Personhood and Moral Status: A Reply to Kagan's Proposal.David DeGrazia - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (1):22-25.
A Compassionate Autonomy Alternative to Speciesism.Constance K. Perry - 2001 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 22 (3):237-246.
Against "Humanism": Speciesism, Personhood, and Preference.Simon Cushing - 2003 - Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (4):556–571.