Formal truth and objective truth

Bulletin of the Section of Logic 13 (3):154-160 (1984)
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Abstract

How can we ever judge about the truth of a scientific theory? Ostensibly it seems to be no problems concerning such a judgement. Each scientific theory is expressed by a set of statements, formulated in a definite language; and we know, in principle, to ascertain whether a sentence is true or false, If we take any formula, say in the first order predicate calculus, no matter how complex, and if we know its interpretation, i.e. the appropriate finite domain of individuals, functions, and truth values of the atoms entering the formula, then we immediately come to know whether our formula is true or false. It is admitted by analogy, that if we come to know the truth values of the basic theory statements, then we can judge if a given theory is true or false. It can be shown, however, that there exists no similar reliable prescription [1]. Let me comment on this in some more detail

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Anguel S. Stefanov
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences

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