Plurality and Choice

In Plural and conflicting values. New York: Oxford University Press (1989)
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Abstract

Engages with the thesis that plurality is an obstacle to choice. Tackles the worry that incommensurable values make sound comparisons and judgments impossible. It is argued that plural and incommensurable features are ubiquitous to moral life as well as ordinary practical deliberation. Despite this predicament, we are nevertheless able to make sound judgements and to bring together disparate and incommensurable values in complex wholes.

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No fact of the matter.Marius Baumann - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):466-478.

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