Abstract

This dissertation tries to understand the general features of the contractarian tradition, in particular Rawls' version, and how it relates to moral theory. The first chapter discusses the contractarianism of Hobbes and Locke, and contends that there are at least two ways of understanding their theories. In one reading they are arguing for a moral principle stating that a person has a moral obligation to obey a sovereign if one actually consents to join the society where he or she rules. In the second reading they argue that one is obligated to such a sovereign if one would consent to join the society where he or she rules. I contend that both readings have certain problems. In the case of Rawls' theory, I go on to suggest broadly epistemological reading that seems more plausible. ;In the second chapter I elaborate on this reading and discuss how Rawls' contractarianism can be seen as subordinated to a coherence view of justification. A contract, being a rational agreement, is largely determined by the agents' beliefs and desires. The conclusion of the second chapter discusses Rawls' description of his contractors' desires. I argue that his description is self-contradictory and go on to show how his difference principle reflects some of the counter-intuitive features of his description. ;The third chapter deals with the knowledge that Rawlsian contractors have. I suggest that Rawls appeals to three different concepts in defending his "veil of ignorance": fairness, impartiality and freedom from contingency. I contend that only the last concept is comprehensive enough to sanction restrictions on information of the extent that Rawls needs to eliminate competing moral theories. But I contend that in general there is little reason to suppose that contingent information is morally irrelevant. ;The fourth chapter returns to some of the problems raised in the second. Given Rawls' "reflective equilibrium" or coherence approach to justification, it is open to him to argue for restrictions on information in the original position simply because more information would lead to morally unacceptable conclusions. I examine this idea, and contend that it seems to assist in the understanding of a critical phenomenon in ethical thinking--that of counterexamples--better than alternatives. I discuss two other philosophers--Hare and Wellman--whose views on counterexamples seem less acceptable. I conclude, somewhat tentatively, that the reflective equilibrium approach to justification does more justice to the structure of actual moral thought than the alternatives