Abstract

At the outset of the Phaedrus, Plato tells us that Socrates’ knows himself (228a). This statement is then followed up by Socrates’ claim that he is not able to obey the Delphic imperative and know himself (229e-230b). This apparent contradiction has given rise to an interesting debate concerning what kind of knowledge we are dealing with here. While the debate is complex a few main positions can be identified. One group of scholars, hereafter referred to as the practitioners, argue that the self-knowledge Socrates here talks about is a life-guiding term. The practitioners argue that when striving toward what is true about oneself and acknowledging one’s limits, one turns away from chaos towards a well structured life. Another group of scholars, referred to as the mystics, argue that self-knowledge is something Socrates’ possesses when contemplating over his own epistemic limits as well as his soul and its connection to the Forms. Finally, the unitarian view explains the content of self-knowledge, namely that it includes dispositional and cognitive knowledge of oneself. Even if these views are helpful to explain the different parts of self-knowledge, they fail to explain Socrates’ apparently contradictory answers regarding self-knowledge. What is lacking, and what this thesis will try to provide, is an account of how Socrates both can say that he knows and does not know himself. The thesis will help explain how Socrates can be said to have self-knowledge. However, Socrates does not yet have absolute self-knowledge and acknowledges, with his denial of self-knowledge, that a deepened self-knowledge can be gained gradually. On the view that this thesis will test and defend, Socratic self-knowledge is a continuum, that is to say, a coherent yet dynamic knowledge. This can help to explain how Socrates can claim to both know and not yet know himself.