Abstract

This article intends to discover the function of phantasia for phronesis. Its main idea is that the practically wise person has the right sort of phantasia associated with the right kind of pleasure and pain and that through the medium of pleasure and pain phronesis and phantasia become connected. First, I examine what Aristotle means when he says that phronesis is a special kind of practical perception which is concerned with ethical particulars. Second, I illustrate the function of phantasia, especially deliberative phantasia, for the ethical agent based on the essential proposition that phantasia has a motivational force based on its representation of things as objects of desire. The virtuous man has the right kind of practical phantasia and phantasmata in the sense that things appear to him as good or pleasurable in the way they are really so. Finally, I argue that natural phantasia and phantasmata which we possess from birth need to be transformed by the practical intellect so that they might acquire moral values; and the pleasure which the virtuous man takes in doing good actions consolidates his virtuous characters so that he can act out of a settled and steadfast dispositions.