Abstract

From the point of view of dialectical materialism, philosophy lies somewhere between the extremes of speculative metaphysics and logical analysis. It has a real object--the most general laws of nature, society, and thought; it attains this object, however, not independently of the special sciences, but only through a logical analysis of its results. Since philosophy studies reality only indirectly, through the sciences, it should be called philosophy of science rather than philosophy of nature. The first task of the philosopher is to analyze the basic concepts of science: space, time, motion, cause. Most of the book is devoted to this task. Space is given a historical survey consisting of short accounts of what various people have said about it, and attributes to Lenin a curious concept of pseudo-absolute space. The discussion of time is organized differently, i.e., by type: absolute, relative, relativistic, biological, and Lenin's pseudo-absolute. Problems of simultaneity and direction of time are touched upon. Causality as a necessary, asymmetrical relation between two coexisting events is defended. The final part of the book is devoted to problems of measurement, relativity, and observation. The aim of the chapter on relativity is to show that this theory supports Lenin's doctrine that "the absolute is in the relative." Observability as the criterion of reality is rejected. Observation is important only as the beginning of knowledge and is transcended in the discovery of general laws. As a whole the book is disappointing because it sacrifices depth to breadth.--T. D. Z.