Public reason, non-public reasons, and the accessibility requirement

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (8):1062-1082 (2019)
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Abstract

In Liberalism without Perfection, Jonathan Quong develops what is perhaps the most comprehensive defense of the consensus model of public reason – a model which incorporates both a public-reasons-only requirement and an accessibility requirement framed in terms of shared evaluative standards. While the consensus model arguably predominates amongst public reason liberals, it is criticized by convergence theorists who reject both the public-reasons-only requirement and the accessibility requirement. In this paper, I argue that while we have good reason to reject Quong’s call for a public-reasons-only requirement, all public reason liberals should endorse at least some shared evaluative standards and, hence, an accessibility requirement.

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Jason Tyndal
College of Southern Nevada

Citations of this work

Civic equality as a democratic basis for public reason.Henrik D. Kugelberg - 2024 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 27 (2):133-155.
In defense of voting method publicity.Aylon Manor - forthcoming - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy.

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Political Liberalism.John Rawls - 1993 - Columbia University Press.
The law of peoples.John Rawls - 1999 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Edited by John Rawls.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Political Liberalism.J. Rawls - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (3):596-598.

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