A Simple Model of Secure Public Communication

Theory and Decision 67 (1):101-122 (2009)
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Abstract

Public communication is secure if a hostile third-party cannot decode the messages exchanged by the communicating parties. In Nash equilibrium, communication by computationally unbounded players cannot be secure. We assume complexity averse players, and show that a simple, secure, and costless communication protocol becomes available as the marginal complexity cost tends to zero

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Hannu Vartiainen
University of Helsinki

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Oddness of the Number of Equilibrium Points: A New Proof.John Harsanyi - 1973 - International Journal of Game Theory 2:235-250.

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