Abstract

The compatibility between the phenomenological method and the subject of the unconscious has long been called into question, not only by external critics but also by authors whose theoretical background had been shaped precisely by their confrontation with Husserl’s phenomenology. To date, the evolution of Husserlian philology, on the one hand, has notably softened such stance, testifying to how the father of phenomenology himself directly and repeatedly grappled with this problem. On the other hand, however, there seem to be intrinsic aspects to the notion of phenomenology as such that would lead to underestimate its potential, outright excluding concepts or entire realms of experience, such as that gathered under the title of the unconscious. In this article, we intend to revisit certain moments in Husserl's work from which it becomes clear that not only is phenomenology capable of addressing the problem of the unconscious, but above all it proves to be particularly effective in accounting for it, providing important methodological indications for its analytical framing. In the concluding section, we will finally touch upon some possible avenues for a phenomenological investigation of the unconscious, differentiated by the assumption of distinct exemplary phenomena as guiding thread (Leitfaden) of the analysis.