Abstract

I explore a particular conception of philosophy metaphorically presented by Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations in the following terms: "What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use". This conception connects philosophy with something ordinary. I examine three questions. First, what it means to bring words back to their everyday use. Second, how this has been done and how it can be done. Third, in what way the everyday use of expressions is taken for granted, what is tacitly acknowledged or accepted in the return to something ordinary, and in what sense that which is accepted makes the return to something ordinary possible. I investigate the senses of 'ordinary' and its lexical synonyms, adapting a lexical approach recently developed by Stroll. To answer the first question, I review the distinction between the use and the employment of a word, explore Wittgenstein's conception of grammar, relate his use of the expression to the current meanings of 'grammar', and explore the contrast traditionally drawn between grammar and rhetoric. To answer the second question, I examine Moore's characteristic replies to paradoxical statements and the structure of his method of proof. I discuss two applications of Moore's method. I explore the third question through a discussion of Wittgenstein's conceptions of grammar and natural history. ;What is taken for granted when we bring words back is uses of language, or language-games. The return is achieved in individual cases rather than once and for all, and when the grammatical point is understood. Bringing words back to their everyday use is a return to the whole of language and human practices, and it presupposes the human form of life. Common sense makes the task of return to something ordinary possible. What is accepted or acknowledged includes general facts of natural history that escape notice. ;Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy leads us to go about solving problems by confronting and overcoming illusions and misunderstandings, hence with a focus on us. Solving or dissolving problems in this way is a condition of insight, but the insight is into something ordinary