Beyond the myth of “self-domination” (Imaginal psychology in the pursuit of cultural shift)

Human Affairs 24 (1):136-147 (2014)
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Abstract

This paper deals with the theoretical concepts of image and imagery as used by the foremost imaginal psychologists. Attributing primary epistemological status to image and imagery, imaginal psychology school developed a new theory of image and imagery, questioning the older thesis on the derivative and secondary epistemological status of the image. Using Jung’s concept of the autonomous psyche of an essentially archetypal nature, Hillman started to question Jung’s concept of the Self as a central archetype symbolizing a sort of disguised traditional monotheism (the Christian God, the Jewish Yahweh etc.) like Freud’s sexuality (id) or central cultural myth (the Oedipus myth). Imaginal psychology defends essential sovereignty and the equality of all images and the resultant polytheist psychology. Jungian studies set out it this direction, giving birth to parallel developments to imaginal psychology in various fields. Derrida’s and Feyerabend’s rejection of an ultimate referential frame was not identical to but corresponds to Hillman’s and Vannoy Adam’s discovery that it is fantasy that rules the psyche.

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Against method.Paul Feyerabend - 1975 - London: New Left Books.
The world as will and representation.Arthur Schopenhauer & E. F. J. Payne - 1958 - [Indian Hills, Colo.]: Falcon's Wing Press. Edited by Judith Norman, Alistair Welchman & Christopher Janaway.
Against Method.P. Feyerabend - 1975 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (4):331-342.

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