Praxeological Enactivism vs. Radical Enactivism: Reply to Hutto

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (5):1177-1182 (2022)
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Abstract

In his recent paper “Getting Real About Pretense: A Radical Enactivist Proposal”, Daniel Hutto raises several objections against our so-called praxeological enactivist account of pretense (Weichold & Rucińska 2022). He argues that one should, instead, adopt his radical enactivist explanation of pretend play. In this short reply, we defend our praxeological enactivist account against his objections, and argue that it has crucial advantages over his radical enactivist alternative.

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Martin Weichold
Universität Regensburg
Zuzanna Rucinska
University of Antwerp

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References found in this work

Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: How Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 2005 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79 (2):47 - 65.
Situated anticipation.Erik Rietveld & Ludger van Dijk - 2018 - Synthese 198 (1):349-371.
Pretend play with objects: an ecological approach.Agnes Szokolszky & Catherine Read - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (5):1043-1068.
Getting real about pretense.Daniel Hutto - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (5):1157-1175.
Pretense as alternative sense-making: a praxeological enactivist account.Martin Weichold & Zuzanna Rucińska - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (5):1131-1156.

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