Abstract

Unavoidable blameworthiness is possible. Against certain ethical rationalist positions I argue that genuine dilemmas and unfulfillable obligations can exist. The first chapter introduces key concepts and theories. ;Philosophers have held that the following positions together are contradictory: genuine moral dilemmas exist; " thinspace'ought' implies 'can' thinspace"; and the agglomerations of obligations are obligatory. The second chapter shows that for some versions of " thinspace'ought' implies 'can' thinspace" no contradiction arises. " thinspace'Ought' implies 'can' thinspace" becomes less attractive when the narrow sense needed here is revealed. Nevertheless, strong motivation to adopt the principle in the sense required exists, as the view that no unavoidable blameworthiness exists is attractive. ;Indeed, aversion to unavoidable blameworthiness motivates both denying the genuineness of dilemmas and adopting " thinspace'ought' implies 'can' thinspace". So the third chapter argues for rare cases of unavoidable blameworthiness on pragmatic grounds. The position that either the action was avoidable or the agent is not blameworthy is not true to some cases of moral risk taking. Rare blameworthiness for more than one can do need not discourage. Contrariwise, this possibility motivates some kinds of moral behaviour and creates challenge. ;The fourth chapter develops examples of genuine dilemmas based on ethical rationalist moral systems. The usual arguments against such cases, for example that the agent must have previously done wrong or that one duty must be conditional, are shown to fail. ;The fifth chapter criticizes Alan Donagan's proposals for eliminating dilemmas resulting from promises. Oddly, his conditions on promising require too much of promisers, making many promises immoral, yet the protection for promisees is inadequate. His use of an epistemic concept to determine when blame was avoidable is problematic. ;Moral systems that allow no unavoidable blame retreat to an area the agent controls, her inner states. The sixth chapter explores how children learn to be accountable. Morality is learnt by participation; this presents unavoidable "first cases" of being held accountable. The retreat to the agent's internal decision makes assessing blame almost impossible, as Kant recognized. Not knowing the internal decisions of others we would not be justified in holding them accountable