Toward a Phenomenology of Conscientious Action and a Theory of the Practicality of Reason: Studies in the History of the Problem
Dissertation, University of Southern California (
1988)
Copy
BIBTEX
Abstract
My thesis is that there is a way of understanding moral knowledge in terms of Husserl's theory of the fulfillment of consciousness which may unify the main types of views held with respect to "the practicality of reason." By "the practicality of reason" I mean the claim that moral knowledge of the appropriate kind constrains moral action. This knowledge is intuitive or experiential knowledge in contrast to mere thought, intentionality or reasoning. I claim that such knowledge is possible and that it places a greater constraint on action than mere moral thought or reasoning. ;The aim of the historical part of my thesis is to delimit the three main types of views held with respect to this thesis, i.e., the traditional, the Humean empiricist and the Kantian idealist, and to show that they all concede some form of "intuitive" or experiential constraint over action, but do not provide an adequate elucidation of it. In Hume's case, the attribution of selectively intentional features to moral sentiment allows for a plausible interpretation of Hume's view as consistent with, if not a concession to, the thesis. In Kant's case, his repeated, although unclarified, appeal to moral "experience" in conjunction with his ultimate appeal to reason supports our contention that he too adheres to the thesis. ;The primary "proof" of my thesis, however, proceeds by way of an independent phenomenological analysis of conscientious action. The moral intuitionism of Richard Price is refined and defended by the application of Husserl's analysis of the intuitive fulfillment of consciousness to moral experience and the will thereto in conscientious action. This analysis reveals that all thought, but especially intuitive thought, involves motivational structures with specific active tendencies. Intuitive moral thought, therefore, constrains to a much greater degree than mere intentional moral thought alone. We conclude with the observation that although the theory of moral perception is highly complex, it is in principle no more complex than an adequate theory of knowledge generally. The intuitive justification of moral knowledge may stand or fall with the intuitive justification of anything at all.