Abstract

Scientific representation is an interesting topic for philosophers of science, many of whom have recently explored it from different points of view. There are currently two competing approaches to the issue: cognitive and non-cognitive, and each of them claims its own merits over the other. This article tries to provide a hybrid theory of scientific representation, called Two-Dimensional Theory of Scientific Representation, which has the merits of the two accounts and is free of their shortcomings. To do this, we will argue that although scientific representation needs to use the notion of intentionality, such a notion is defined and realized in a simply structural form contrary to what cognitive approach says about intentionality. After a short introduction, the second part of the paper is devoted to introducing theories of scientific representation briefly. In the third part, the structural accounts of representation will be criticized. The next step is to introduce the two-dimensional theory which involves two key components: fixing and structural fitness. It will be argued that fitness is an objective and non-intentional relation, while fixing is intentional.