Synthese 175 (1):13 - 31 (2010)
This article attempts to motivate a new approach to anti-realism (or nominalism) in the philosophy of mathematics. I will explore the strongest challenges to anti-realism, based on sympathetic interpretations of our intuitions that appear to support realism. I will argue that the current anti-realistic philosophies have not yet met these challenges, and that is why they cannot convince realists. Then, I will introduce a research project for a new, truly naturalistic, and completely scientific approach to philosophy of mathematics. It belongs to anti-realism, but can meet those challenges and can perhaps convince some realists, at least those who are also naturalists.
|Keywords||Philosophy of mathematics Anti-realism Realism Naturalism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Are There Genuine Mathematical Explanations of Physical Phenomena?Alan Baker - 2005 - Mind 114 (454):223-238.
A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics.John P. Burgess & Gideon A. Rosen - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Naturalism and Abstract Entities.Feng Ye - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):129-146.
Feng Ye. Strict Finitism and the Logic of Mathematical Applications.Nigel Vinckier & Jean Paul Van Bendegem - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica 24 (2):247-256.
Similar books and articles
Against Logical Realism.Michael D. Resnik - 1999 - History and Philosophy of Logic 20 (3-4):181-194.
Beyond the Axioms: The Question of Objectivity in Mathematics.W. W. Tait - 2001 - Philosophia Mathematica 9 (1):21-36.
A Truthmaking Account of Realism and Anti-Realism.Jamin Asay - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):373-394.
Added to index2009-04-20
Total downloads342 ( #8,148 of 2,163,972 )
Recent downloads (6 months)23 ( #15,316 of 2,163,972 )
How can I increase my downloads?