Abstract

The dissertation reviews the theory of relational psychoanalysis. As promising as the general direction of this theory seems, however, problems remain. These include lack of clarity about the nature and justification of the analyst's knowledge of human personality and behavior, confusion about how cultural and moral values are reflected in psychoanalytic theory and practice, and questions about the basis of the analyst's authority and influence in therapy and as an advocate for some vision of the good life. In view of these concerns, this dissertation pursues a critical inquiry into relational theory and practice that is intended to contribute to a broader goal of evaluating the psychotherapy enterprise as a viable form of treatment for the psychological, emotional, and spiritual woes of our time. It is argued that psychoanalysis tends to be uncritical about how its theories and practices are embedded in a particular moral and cultural outlook that may actually be instrumental in bringing about the suffering and distress that it aspires to treat. By examining the underlying assumptions of the relational perspective as they are expressed through its understanding of analytic authority and the moral vision it engenders, the dissertation attempts to provide a more balanced and thoroughgoing understanding of the role that analytic therapy, in particular, and psychotherapy, in general, play in our modern world. The dissertation argues that relational psychoanalysis must go even further than it has in acknowledging that its theory and practice are thoroughly embedded in the ongoing cultural, moral, and political discussion and interplay of forces in our society. Only by doing so will it be possible to take full advantage of the relational perspective, augment it, and expropriate its insights for the human sciences generally without uncritically perpetuating features of the cultural status quo that unwittingly contribute to the psychological and emotional difficulties in our time. Developing a fresh understanding of analytic authority and the moral dimensions of psychoanalysis requires elaborating a new ontology of human subjectivity and social life. A sketch is offered of how this gargantuan task might be started, which involves integrating psychoanalysis within a hermeneutic perspective on dialogue, suggesting that it would be helpful to view psychoanalysis as promoting Aristotelian practical wisdom, and rethinking psychoanalytic theory and interpretation as a form of social practice