Abstract

Integrating the behavioral theory of the firm and agency theory, this study is the first to examine the antecedents of firms' choice to disclose low-quality accounting information from the perspective of performance persistence below aspirations. Based on empirical data of 31,326 firm-annual observations involving 3584 listed companies for the 2007–2021 period, we find that firms actively reduce accounting information reliability and comparability in the presence of performance persistence below aspirations. Furthermore, we find that CEO-CFO surname ties enhance the negative effect of performance persistence below aspirations on accounting information comparability. Finally, we find that agency costs play a mediating role in the relationship that performance persistence below aspirations has with accounting information reliability and comparability. This study is the first to examine performance persistence below aspirations and accounting information reliability and comparability. Meanwhile, this study provides important insights for policymakers to improve the quality of capital market information and for shareholders to improve the quality of corporate governance.