According to Spinoza, “... if we suppose that a person perceives his own lack of power because he recognizes that something is more powerful than himself... then we conceive that the person is simply understanding himself distinctly... ” (Ethics IV, Demonstration to Proposition 53, my italics). What does Spinoza mean by ‘something’ here? Given that there are two kinds of adequate cognition for Spinoza, which one is at stake when we understand that something is more powerful than ourselves? This paper (...) addresses these underexamined questions by considering different ways of conceiving our weakness against the backdrop of Spinoza's epistemological and metaphysical commitments. (shrink)

RésuméCet article examine la distinction essence-existence dans la théorie des modes de Spinoza. Cette distinction est généralement faite de deux manières. Premièrement, l'essence et exis-tence sont séparées par leur cause. Les essences découlent verticalement de l'essence de Dieu, tandis que l'existence découle horizontalement d'autres modes. Je présente des arguments textuels et systématiques contre une telle bifurcation causale. Deuxièmement, l'essence et l'existence se distinguent par leur nature temporelle. L'essence est éternelle. L'existence dure. Cependant, dans plusieurs passages, Spinoza écrit que l’éternité et (...) la durée constituent deux manières de comprendre la nature plutôt que deux aspects réellement distincts de la nature. (shrink)

Abstract: In the "Ethics" Spinoza denies that humility is a virtue on the grounds that it arises from a reflection on our lack of power, rather than a rational understanding of our power (Part IV, Proposition 53, Demonstration). He suggests that humility, to the extent that it involves a consideration of our weakness, indicates a lack of self-understanding. However, in a brief remark in the same demonstration he also allows that conceiving our lack of power can be conducive to self-understanding (...) and an increase in power, on the condition that we “conceive [it] because [we] understand (intelligit) something more powerful than [ourselves].” Unfortunately, Spinoza does not flesh out this remark, nor does he specify the name of the affect that arises from thus conceiving our weakness. Commentators have not been of much help in this regard either. What does it mean, in the Spinozistic framework, to conceive our weakness because we understand something more powerful than ourselves? And what exactly is the difference between this instance of conceiving our lack of power and the one that is involved in humility? This paper will examine the nature of this difference by analyzing its metaphysical and epistemological underpinnings, as well as its ethical implications within Spinoza’s Ethics. In doing so, it will highlight the ethical importance and epistemological conditions of recognizing our weakness in the Spinozistic universe. Abraham Wolf takes Spinoza’s denial of humility’s virtue in the Ethics to imply that “the rational man should think of what he can do, not of what he cannot do.” While I agree with Wolf’s remark, my reading in this paper will show that as the rational person thinks of her power and what she can do, she never loses sight of her ineliminable weakness as a finite mode. (shrink)

Spinoza’s bold claim that there exists only a single infinite substance entails that finite things pose a deep challenge: How can Spinoza account for their finitude and their plurality? Taking finite bodies as a test case for finite modes in general I articulate the necessary conditions for the existence of finite things. The key to my argument is the recognition that Spinoza’s account of finite bodies reflects both Cartesian and Hobbesian influences. This recognition leads to the surprising realization there must (...) be more to finite bodies than their finitude, a claim that goes well beyond the basic substance-monism claim, namely, that anything that is, is in God. This leads to the conclusion, which may seem paradoxical, that finite bodies have both an infinite as well as a finite aspect to them. Finite bodies, I argue, both actively partially determine all the other finite bodies, thereby partially causing their existence insofar as they are finite, as well as are determined by the totality of other bodies. I articulate precisely what this infinite aspect is and how it is distinct from the general substance-monism dictum. (shrink)

In this paper, through a close reading of Spinoza's use of common notions I argue for the role of experiential and experimental knowledge in Spinoza's epistemology.