From PhilPapers forum Philosophy of Mind:

2009-06-10
The 'Explanatory Gap'
Reply to Derek Allan
Stevan,

Let me rephrase that last question, since its point was apparently unclear:  Wouldn't whatever feels feelings (in some particular instance) be different if feelings had not been felt (in that particular instance)?

To explain the purpose of this question, consider another:  Do you distinguish between X (that which causes a feeling and Y (in which feelings are felt)?

If so, then "feelings" are events which are not simply causes of feelings; and whatever feels feelings (in some particular case) would be different had these events not occured.

If not, then the term "feelings" refers to the causes of feelings, and those are what you term "functing."


Derek,

DA:  "I have never observed a word, except in writing (which is simply a convention)."

Why do you assume that sight is the only available form of observation?

DA:  "Are the methods or procedures of science the same as those a novelist uses to write a novel, for example, or a composer to write a symphony, or a historian to write history?" 

I wouldn't say writing a novel or composing a symphony were acts of discovery.  As for history, one could argue that historians can be scientific in their methodology to varying degrees.

DA:  "Science was born at a particular point in history when, precisely, its methods and procedures were accepted as a valid means of knowledge."

Again, my question:  What methods and procedures are you talking about?