From PhilPapers forum Philosophy of Mind:

2010-04-14
The time-lag argument for the representational theory of perception

Dear Jonathan,<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" />

 

Doesn’t the brain compensate for the time-lag? We know that the brain uses all sorts of background information, learned or inherited, in making sense of the skimpy information it receives from the senses, and we know it also tries to put things right when the information it receives seems abnormal in some way (so, e.g., we ‘see’ a picture of a whole face when we are actually presented with a picture of half a face in one-half of the visual field). So if we see an approaching object, perhaps the visual information is adjusted by the brain to take account of the 0.1 second time-lapse, so that we see a representation of where the object is (or ought to be) rather than where it was 0.1 seconds ago. I have a vague (and possibly mistaken) recollection of reading something like this in a book on the brain.

 

You say that: 'Directly experiencing the world' turns out to be a pseudodynamic folk concept that cannot be explicated without self-contradiction.

 

I suspect you are right, but I would like to see the self-contradiction spelt out.

 

You say: There is no 'stuff' out there that our experience 'simulates'. Such an idea is as self contradictory as the direct perception one and modern physics shows empirically that it is invalid.

 

Again, I would like to see the self-contradiction spelt out. And what bit of physics are you referring to?

 

Best wishes,

 

Danny