2010-04-16
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Describing zombies
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Derek AllanAustralian National University
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Hi Hugh
Yes it was this exact quote I was working from.
RE: "I take it that you understand premise (1), and hold that it
is true."
I do have a problem with "our world" but I'm happy to let that pass for the moment.
RE: "Chalmers argument in defense of (2) is the stuff about a logically
possible world that is physically exactly like ours in every way, but
‘mentally’ different. The ‘people’ there are zombies. He claims that it
is logically possible for there to be zombies. " etc
Problems here. How, to start with, have we jumped from "in which the positive facts about consciousness in our world do not
hold" to a world where "The ‘people’ there are zombies". Plus, the notion of a "zombie" is incoherent as I've pointed out. However, let's even let that drop too.
You say that the other world is one in which "it would for
instance be the case that “There is no such thing as reveling in the
sound of the violin”, etc. But this is surely a totally inadequate explanation. What does it amount to? It is presumably trying to say (generalizing) that all the experiences, responses (or whatever term we choose) we can have in our world are not available in this other world. But that is obviously begging the question. What do we understand by "experiences" (or whatever alternative we choose)? Do they have a "consciousness" component? (The physicalist will say no.) And if we say yes, what do we mean by consciousness? In short, how do we characterize another world which is the "negative" version of ours if we are unable to say what ours is like?
RE: "Item (3) is a conclusion drawn from premise (1) and (2). Not a premise."
Yes I am aware of that. You write: "The conclusion here is that facts about things like reveling in the
music, or drinking in the color – facts about our experience, must be
facts about something ‘over and above’ the strictly physical realm".
But for the reason given above (which is essentially the same as in my earlier posts) no such thing has been established. If we can't say what our - or the other - world is like without begging questions (about what you term "the facts about experience") no conclusions whatsoever can be drawn.
RE: "Item (4) concludes from (3) that it is a mistake to think that a final
and complete physics, astronomy, chemistry, biology, etc. would give us a
complete account of the real world – that that’s the whole story – that
that’s all there is."
I am actually in sympathy with this view but, for the reasons I give, nothing in Chalmers' argument goes within a bull's roar of establishing it.
DA
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