SH: "So whereas we certainly cannot ... doubt that feelings exist ( [1] and whereas feelings are themselves caused ... by our brains almost as certainly as apples are caused to fall by gravity), [2] we can conclude ... that feelings almost certainly do not themselves have any causal consequences.  [3] So we cannot explain (causally) why we feel. All we can explain is what our bodies can do (and how). Feelings piggy-back (somehow) on that functing, without any causal consequences, although they are quite tightly correlated with our functing."

Stevan, your comments above perplex me. According to [1], you assert that feelings are caused by the brain, and according to [2], feelings have no causal consequences. It seems to me that you are claiming feelings are either (a) non-physical events caused by the brain in a dualistic universe and naturally have no causal consequences for subsequent brain activity, or (b) they are physical events cause by the brain but have no causal consequences for subsequent brain activity. Which case (a or b) do you endorse?


According to your statement [3] above, I take it that in order to explain why we feel we would have to show that feelings have causal consequences. Am I correct in assuming from these statements that you believe we can explain how the brain causes feelings, but we are unable to explain why the brain causes feelings?


...AT