From PhilPapers forum Epistemology:

2009-05-04
Essential Epistemology: 1900-1950
Some items to list:
Rudolf Carnap, “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (1950):

C I Lewis, "The Pragmatic Element in Knowledge" University of California Publications in Philosophy,
Vol. 6, (1926)

C I Lewis, "A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori", The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XX, No. 7,
March 1923. pp. 169-177

C I Lewis, "Experience and Meaning", The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLIII (1934),
No. 2, pp. 125-146

C. I Lewis, Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, (The Paul Carus Lectures, Series 8, 1946) Open Court, La Salle, 1946.   -- this was the most discussed book on epistemology for the next few years and was central -- in a negative sort of way -- in organizing opposition to and finaly the death of sensedatum theory

Wilfrid Sellars, "Pure Pragmatics and Epistemology," Philosophy of Science, Vol. 14, No. 3. (Jul., 1947), pp. 181-202

Wilfrid Sellars, "Realism and the New Way of Words," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 8, No. 4. (Jun., 1948), pp. 601-634.

Wilfrid Sellars, "Inference and Meaning," Mind 62 (1953): 313-38. (out of range but...

Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," The Philosophical Review 60: 20-43 (1951) OK its out of the range!
 H A Pritchard, Knowledge and Perception, Oxford Clarendon 1950

Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind 1949, Hutchinson

HH Price Various things on perception 1932 Perception to 1953 Thinking and Experience

Two remarks. First 1950 is such a terrible cuttoff.  After C.I. Lewis published AKV, the currents all went against certainty based foundationalism -- think of Sellars, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Quine, Ryle -- all of whom dominated the early 50's and transformed epistemology so that by the mid sixties third person, fallibalist, causalist views had swept the Russell/Lewis sort of view almost entirely away.
Second,  The other thing whichg happened is that analytic philosophy became much narrower  avter the "linguistic turn", so that Pragmatism and continental strands of epistemoilogy which until that time had been in close conversation with analysis, dropped off the table. The idea that knowledge is experience rather than a proipositional attitude became very unpopular