From PhilPapers forum Continental Philosophy:

2009-05-07
The analytic/continental divide
Reply to Derek Allan
Hi Derek,

The brief historical answer to why logic figured so prominently in early analytic philosophy comes from Frege.  He launched a fierce campaign against "psychologism" (including against one of Husserl's early works, criticisms which Husserl accepted) which argued that if logic is merely a matter of how human minds happen to think, it loses all normativity.  He created a logical Platonism, if you will, where thoughts exist in a separate timeless realm which is what allows them to rule our thinking.  If logic is descriptive, it can't be prescriptive, which it is and must be.  Moore's ethical intuition and Russell's empiricism both emerge from these ideas.

I certainly agree that analytic philosophy generally models itself on science (rigorous, essay format, widely dispersed narrowly focused tasks) and continental tends to think of itself as closer to art, literature, and the "soft" sciences like psychology and sociology (each thinker seeks insight into large deep issues, allusive and richly ambiguous writing, book format).  Heidegger frequently extols poetry as the activity closest to philosophy; Merleau-Ponty engaged in considerable psychological analysis; Sartre was a successful writer ("No Exit" and Nausea are pretty good); Foucault engages in a lot of quasi-psychological&-sociological analysis (while bashing psychology); Lacan and Derrida are pretty obvious.  Rorty made much of this distinction (though he also argued, from Deweyan principles, that there is no firm break between the 2 types of science).  In fact, after Quine, many analytic philosophers think of philosophy as continuous with science whereas I can't think of any philosophers who believe this (Husserl & Hegel wanted to make philosophy "wissenschaftlich" but they didn't mean the same thing).

Of course it's impossible to make any universal statements about either camp, as Glock demonstrates in great detail in his very thorough What is Analytic Philosophy?  But we can still make generalizations, salted with the proper degree of caveats.

Regarding art, I read the entire first section of Heidegger's "Origin of the Work of Art" as a reductio of trying to think about art with theories instead of going "to the artworks themselves."  If you're interested, I lay this out in my commentary on this essay in Heidegger's Later Writings: A Reader's Guide (http://www.amazon.com/Heideggers-Later-Writings-Readers-Guides/dp/0826439675/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1241702422&sr=8-1).

BTW, I use Steinberg's The Sexuality of Christ... in my "History of the Body" class--it really shakes the students up!