DA:  "'Feels' in this context obviously means much the same as 'experiences' and 'be conscious of'....  It doesn't give us any leverage on the idea of consciousness at all i.e. it's not an explanation..."

Glad you got the point, at last. (The "hard" problem of consciousness is to explain how and why we feel. There is no such explanation. Unlike Tom Nagel, I also think this explanatory gap cannot be closed, and I've stated many times why: the incommensurability of feeling and function, despite the correlation; the functional superfluousness of feeling in a functional explanation of the brain's performance capacity; the exhaustiveness of the four fundamental forces, leaving no room or evidence for a fifth force; hence the falsity of telekinetic dualism.)

Now, what's your point, Derek? Is it just nonspecific animus against what you keep calling "analytic philosophy"? Or do you actually have a substantive point to make about the explanatory gap?

-- SH