Abstract

God's knowledge of material things is among the most complicated philosophical problems the complexity of which stems from the status of the changing existence of material objects. Accordingly, such knowledge must be explained in a way that the cognitive relation between Almighty Necessary and changing material things does not lead to the rise of any change or plurality in His Essence. Mulla Sadra's general view of solving the cognitive relationship between Almighty Necessary and material things comparing to that of Ibn Sina enjoys particular comprehensibility and has removed the defects of his theories in this regard, such as considering God's knowledge of other than God as acquired knowledge and their failing to demonstrate the Necessary's essential knowledge of other than Himself. Mulla Sadra's fundamental innovation regarding the Necessary's knowledge of material things is benefitting from the principle of truth in its simplicity in demonstrating the fixed essential knowledge of Almighty Truth. On the other hand, he considers Almighty Necessary's actual knowledge of material things to be the same as their external presence before Him. Since he attributes God's cognitive perfection to His essential knowledge, he argues that the changeability of actual knowledge does not prove the existence of any defect in His almighty essence. This is because, in his view, actual knowledge, which is the same as act, is considered the cognitive perfection of act rather than that of the agent. Of course, Mulla Sadra has some seemingly contradictory statements in his explanation of God's knowledge of material things which are justifiable if viewed from two different perspectives