Abstract

The debate over the nature of moral facts is as old as philosophy itself and is once again the focus of moral philosophy. That debate is known as the moral realism anti-realism debate which involves two opposing views of morality. On the one side are the moral realists who argue for the existence of objective moral facts and argue that moral truth is not dependent in any way upon subjective factors such as our beliefs, opinions, desires, reasons, etc. On the other side are the moral anti-realists who argue for the existence of moral facts and truth which are in some way dependent upon subjective factors such as our beliefs, opinions, desires, reasons, etc. ;In spite of the debate's age, it is not anywhere near being resolved; thus my dissertation will add another voice to the dialogue. While the moral realism debate is large and diverse in approaches, my dissertation will focus on one specific approach to the debate, that being what can be known about the nature of moral facts by examining the role moral facts play in moral explanations. My dissertation has the following goals. One goal is to try to understand the debate between the moral realists and the anti-realists. I will seek this understanding my examining one of the prominent theories of moral anti-realism, that of Gilbert Harman. I will also examine and evaluate objections and responses to Harman's work by two of his major critics, Nicholas Sturgeon and David Brink, who argue for moral realism. A second goal is to determine if a solution to the debate is possible. Based on my evaluation and analysis of the debates, I conclude that as it now stands, the moral realism debate is very difficult to manage and there is no way to determine if one side is better than the other. Being an optimist, I offer some suggestions for improving the moral realism debate, but ultimately conclude with a practical suggestion that perhaps we need no solution