Online research in philosophy

The notion that individuals have the right to define their identities, as fickle as those identities may be, is an important constitutional value that, among others, is embraced by our constitutional system. Through many different mechanisms we shape our identities and select how to project them. Those identity-formation tools include decisions we make regarding the way we choose to live our lives in fundamental matters. One important constitutional hook on which this value hangs, in U.S. and Puerto Rico Constitutional Law, is decisionmaking privacy. The article considers how identity-definition in Puerto Rico and United States constitutional law may be used to bolster legal and political claims in contexts such as intimate sexual relations, same-sex marriage and unconventional family relations. Because the Constitution of Puerto Rico is a result of the combination of different constitutional traditions, our right to privacy is infused with American and Continental notions of privacy and human dignity. It thus provides an ideal context to analyze decisionmaking privacy as a constitutional repository for identity-definition values.

One of the most basic principles of American constitutionalism is that Congress cannot statutorily overturn the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions. Although it can reverse statutory decisions, Congress is not able to supersede the Court's constitutional rules because it cannot change the source of law being interpreted - the Constitution - outside of the amendment process of Article V. Given the problems with judicial supremacy for many constitutional theorists, there has been a noticeable gap in the literature on the ways in which Congress can, in fact, successfully challenge the Court's reading of the Constitution. Few scholars provide any account of how other governmental institutions or even the constitutional culture at large can directly confront and overturn a given constitutional rule. This Article seeks to address this gap in the scholarship by highlighting three areas - three lacunae - where Congress has the ability to displace constitutional rules by statute. Congress has the power to overturn constitutional decisions in three specific areas within the federalism realm: state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, intergovernmental tax immunity for both state and federal governments, and the Dormant Commerce Clause. This Article will demonstrate that judicial decisions on these subjects create true constitutional rules and that the acceptance of Congress's power to overturn these decisions tells us something important about our Constitution and our federalism. The existence of these three anomalies suggests that adaptability and accommodation often take constitutional precedence over theoretical purity, especially when issues of federalism are involved.

What are our constitutional possibilities? The importance of this question is illustrated by the striking breadth of recent discussions, ranging from the interpretation of the United States Constitution as a guarantee of fundamental economic equality and proposals to restore the lost constitution to arguments for the virtual abandonment of structural provisions of the Constitution of 1789. Such proposals are conventionally understood as placing constitutional options on the table as real options for constitutional change. Normative constitutional theory asks the question whether these options are desirable - whether political actors (citizens, legislators, executives, or judges) should take action to bring about their plans for constitutional reform or revolution. Frequently, normative constitutional theories are criticized on the ground that they are undesirable, unwise, on inconsistent with the best theories of political morality and legitimate legal authority, but sometimes one hears a very different form of criticism, expressed in locutions such as the following: That is unrealistic. That's not possible. That is pie in the sky. You are imagining castles in the air. Your suggestion is utopian. That isn't feasible. These objections invoke the idea of ephemeral constitutional possibility - constitutional options that are not real or actual possibilities. What are our constitutional possibilities? How should we think about the feasible choice set for constitutional change? What are the differences between ideal and nonideal theory? What role should the ideas of path dependency and second best play in constitutional theory? These inquiries cross the lines between normative, positive, and conceptual constitutional theory. At the conceptual level, we can ask what phrases like constitutional possibility, ideal theory, and the feasible choice set mean. At the level of positive constitutional theory, we can ask about the forces and institutions that condition constitutional possibility. At the level of normative constitutional theory, we can ask about the implications of constitutional possibility for political morality. Constitutional Possibilities proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the idea of ephemeral constitutional possibilities. Part II will cobble together a conceptual toolkit for thinking about possibility and necessity in constitutional theory: the tools include: (a) the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory, (b) the notion of a constitutional second best, and (c) an introduction to possible-worlds semantics. Part III will explore the implications of the resulting proto-theory of constitutional possibility in two stages: stage one will investigate the normative implications, whereas stage two will reconnoiter a set of standards for making modal claims in constitutional arguments. Part IV provides a case study in constitutional possibility by examining Sanford Levinson's proposal for a constitutional convention. Part V concludes wit

The conundrum of the unconstitutional constitution -- The quest for a compelling unity -- The permeability of constitutional borders -- The sounds of silence : militant and acquiescent constitutionalism -- "The first page of the constitution" : family, state, and identity.

This is the second volume in a sub-series of specially commissioned collaborative volumes on key topics at the heart of contemporary philosophy of law that will be appearing regularly within Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law. A distinguished international team of legal theorists examine the issue of constitutionalism and pose such foundational questions as: why have a constitution? How do we know what the constitution of a country really is? How should a constitution be interpreted? Why should one generation feel bound by the constitution of an earlier one? The volume will be of particular importance to those in philosophy, law, political science and international relations interested in what kinds of constitutions should be adopted in countries without them, and involved in debates about constitutional interpretation.

This book explores two basic questions regarding constitutional theory. First, in view of a commitment to democratic self-rule and widespread disagreement on questions of value, how is the creation of a legitimate constitutional regime possible? Second, what must be true about a constitution if the regime that it supports is to retain its claim to legitimacy? Howard Schweber shows that the answers to these questions appear in a theory of constitutional language that combines democratic theory with constitutional philosophy. The creation of a legitimate constitutional regime depends on a shared commitment to a particular and specialized form of language. Out of this simple observation, Schweber develops arguments about the characteristics of constitutional language, the necessary differences between constitutional language and the language of ordinary law or morality, as well as the authority of officials such as judges to engage in constitutional review of laws.

The philosophical and natural law basis of the American order: remote and immediate ancestors -- The declaration and its constitution: linking first principle to necessary means -- A structurally-divided, but workable, government -- A limited government of enumerated power -- A government mindful of dual sovereignty -- A fair government -- A government commitment to freedom -- A government commitment to equality -- A government of imperfect knowledge of inkblots, liberty and life itself.

The constitutional subject : singular, plural or universal? -- The constitutional subject and the clash of self and other : on the uses of negation, metaphor, and metonymy -- Reinventing tradition through constitutional interpretation : the case of unenumerated rights in the United States -- Recasting and reorienting identity through constitution-making : the pivotal case of Spain's 1978 Constitution -- Constitutional models : shaping, nurturing, and guiding the constitutional subject -- Models of constitution making -- The constitutional subject and clashing visions of citizenship : can we be beyond what we are not? -- Can the constitutional subject go global? imagining a convergence of the universal, the particular, and the singular.

Since constitutional arrangements are what make politics work, they are a central concern of political theory._This book, now completely updated, is the first comprehensive exploration of the political theory of constitutions. Jan-Erik Lane begins by examining the origins and history of constitutionalism and answers key questions such as: What is a constitution? Why are there constitutions? From where does constitutionalism originate? How is the constitutional state related to democracy and justice? Constitutions play a major role in domestic and international politics in the early 21st century and an updated version of this classic textbook will introduce students to a number of different areas -- theoretical, empirical, and moral -- which will aid their understanding of this important topic.