David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
This paper discusses some of the modal involvements of analytical mechanics. I first review the elementary aspects of the Lagrangian, Hamiltonian and Hamilton-Jacobi approaches. I then discuss two modal involvements; both are related to David Lewis' work on modality, especially on counterfactuals. The first is the way Hamilton-Jacobi theory uses ensembles, i.e. sets of possible initial conditions. The structure of this set of ensembles remains to be explored by philosophers. The second is the way the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian approaches' variational principles state the law of motion by mentioning contralegal dynamical evolutions. This threatens to contravene the principle that any actual truth, in particular an actual law, is made true by actual facts. Though this threat can be avoided, at least for simple mechanical systems, it repays scrutiny; not least because it leads to some open questions.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Thomas Kroedel (2012). Counterfactuals and the Epistemology of Modality. Philosophers' Imprint 12 (12).
Olimpia Lombardi & Mario Castagnino (2008). A Modal-Hamiltonian Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 39 (2):380-443.
Valentine Hacquard (2009). On the Interaction of Aspect and Modal Auxiliaries. Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (3):279-315.
Danilo Suster (1996). Modality and Supervenience. Acta Analytica 15 (15):141-155.
Erik Curiel, Classical Mechanics is Lagrangian; It is Not Hamiltonian; the Semantics of Physical Theory is Not Semantical.
Jeremy Butterfield (2004). David Lewis Meets Hamilton and Jacobi. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1095-1106.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads70 ( #60,366 of 1,796,357 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #467,624 of 1,796,357 )
How can I increase my downloads?