Good and Bad Reasoning about COVID-19

Informal Logic 40 (4):521-544 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The Covid-19 pandemic presents argumentation theorists with an opportunity to reflect on the ways in which people, agencies and governments respond to the emergence of a new virus. Reponses have revealed a range of judgements and decisions, not all of which are rationally warranted. This article will examine errors in reasoning, several of which have reduced the public’s compliance with important health measures. This article will also analyse rationally warranted reasoning about Covid-19 employed by public health agencies. In examining instances of good and bad reasoning during the Covid-19 pandemic, we can begin to construct a taxonomy of arguments that facilitated and hindered individual and collective responses during this public health emergency.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,503

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The COVID-19 containment in Vietnam: What are we doing?Toan Luu Duc Huynh - 2020 - Journal of Global Health 10 (1):010338.
COVID-19 and mental health: government response and appropriate measures.Genevieve Bandares-Paulino & Randy A. Tudy - 2020 - Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 30 (7):378-382.
All People.Greg Kaebnick - 2020 - Hastings Center Report 50 (2):2-2.
COVID-19 and Healthcare professionals: The principle of the common good.Randy A. Tudy - 2020 - Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 30 (4):170-174.
Moral leadership during the pandemic.Christopher Ryan Maboloc - 2020 - Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 30 (6):284-287.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-12-19

Downloads
24 (#651,177)

6 months
3 (#968,143)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Louise Cummings
Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Citations of this work

The Fallacy of Misplaced Presumption.James B. Freeman - 2023 - Argumentation 37 (2):217-231.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Arguments From Ignorance.Douglas N. Walton - 1995 - Pennsylvania State University Press.
Fallacies Arising from Ambiguity.Douglas Walton - 1996 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
Arguments from Ignorance.Douglas N. Walton - 1997 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 30 (1):97-101.
Nonfallacious Arguments from Ignorance.Douglas Walton - 1992 - American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (4):381 - 387.

View all 14 references / Add more references