The Voluntary in Aristotle's Philosophy: Action, Character, Responsibility
Dissertation, University of Virginia (
2000)
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Abstract
The present dissertation explores the Aristotelian notion of the bekousion. This notion---together with its opposite, the akousion---assumes center stage in those parts of Aristotle's ethical works where he examines the conditions under which an action is open to moral evaluation. It also plays an important role in Nicomachean Ethics III 5, where Aristotle argues that people are the makers of their own character. The main aim of the dissertation is to show that Aristotle's use of "bekousion" and "akousion " to qualify actions reflects considerations of moral responsibility, and that these, in turn, answer to principles that are themselves moral, and not just metaphysical. Proving this result is philosophically significant because a number of prominent contemporary philosophers have understood moral evaluation as a two-step procedure. That is, they believe, non-moral critertia---especially causal criteria---serve to determine whether an individual is responsible for an action; and it is only after this first step, and depending on the results it yields, that moral considerations about the action come into play. Aristotle's treatment of topics such as action, duress, and the formation of character exposes the error of this position by clarifying that ascriptions of moral responsibility always presuppose a moral context, and are in large measure independent of causal considerations