Abstract

The history of British financial market supervision seems to be repeating itself: in 1997 a new Government announced sweeping reform to the institutional framework just days after it came to power; with another new Government in place after the 2010 election, major institutional restructuring has started all over again.This article contends that while fixing the Financial Services Authority (FSA) was a solid option in principle, politics dictated the result. It then proceeds to examine the substance behind the politics. Since all institutional models for financial market supervision have pros and cons, the article argues that flaws must be expected in the objectives-oriented institutional model that the UK has now opted for. Close study of the FSA's track record could help address the risk of wrong turns in institutional design. The article looks at the FSA's experience in four key areas—style of supervision, enforcement, efficiency and economy and consumer protection. The article acknowledges that the loss of some positive features will be an inevitable consequence of the break-up. It identifies aspects of the FSA's approach that will be inherited by its successors but which may not endure in the longer term. It also pinpoints some new challenges