Ultimacy and alternative possibilities

Philosophical Studies 144 (1):15 - 20 (2009)
Abstract
I explore a key feature of Robert Kane’s libertarianism (about which I have been puzzled for some time). Kane claims that we should separate issues of alternative possibilities from issues of ultimacy, but he further argues that they are connected in a certain way. I call into question this connection, and I continue to argue for a strict separation of considerations pertaining to alternative possibilities and “actual-sequence” considerations.
Keywords Robert Kane  Alternative possibilities  Ultimate responsibility  Libertarianism
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References found in this work BETA
J. M. Fischer (2007). In Fischer, Kane Et Al. In John Martin Fischer (ed.), Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Pub..
John Martin Fischer (1982). Responsibility and Control. Journal of Philsophy 79 (January):24-40.
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