Neuroscience, Free Will and Responsibility

Journal of Ethics in Mental Health 4:1-6 (2009)
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Abstract

Some cognitive neuroscientists and psychologists claim that our conscious mental states and actions can be explained entirely in terms of unconscious mechanical processes in the brain. This suggests that our belief in free will is an illusion and that we cannot be responsible for our actions. I argue that neuroscience as such does not threaten free and responsible agency. The real threat to free will is not normal brain function but brain dysfunction that impairs or undermines our capacity for agency

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